Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?

I argue that Jonas Olson’s argument from irreducible normativity is not a secure basis for an argument for error theory (section 1) and that a better basis is provided by the argument from supervenience, which has more bite against non-naturalist moral realism than Olson is willing to allow (section...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Toppinen, Teemu (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2016
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2016, Volume: 13, Issue: 4, Pages: 437-460
Further subjects:B quasi-realism
B Non-naturalism
B moral supervenience
B Jonas Olson
B evolutionary debunking
B Expressivism
B Error Theory
B robust realism
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Summary:I argue that Jonas Olson’s argument from irreducible normativity is not a secure basis for an argument for error theory (section 1) and that a better basis is provided by the argument from supervenience, which has more bite against non-naturalist moral realism than Olson is willing to allow (section 2). I suggest there may be a view which can allow for the existence of irreducibly normative facts while remaining unaffected by the kinds of arguments that work against non-naturalist realism. This view is expressivism. Interestingly, James Dreier has recently suggested that expressivism may not escape these arguments. I very briefly outline (but do not pursue) possible response strategies for expressivists (section 3). I close by discussing Olson’s argument against expressivism. Olson suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that expressivism is a bad fit with a plausible evolutionary explanation of our moral thought. I argue that Olson’s argument does not succeed (section 4).
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01304004