Précis of Unbelievable Errors
In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This Précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of m...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
[2018]
|
In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, Volume: 8, Issue: 4, Pages: 257-269 |
Further subjects: | B
Belief
B Non-cognitivism B Error Theory B non-reductive realism B reductive realism |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This Précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of my explanation of our inability to believe the theory. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Reference: | Kritisiert in "Willing Belief (2018)"
Kritisiert in "Necessarily Coextensive Predicates and Reduction (2018)" Kritisiert in "Naturalism and the Error Theory (2018)" |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181351 |