Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee
I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2019
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2019, Volume: 16, Issue: 6, Pages: 743-754 |
| Further subjects: | B
Non-cognitivism
B Error Theory B reductive realism B non-reductive realism |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01606002 |