Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee
I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2019
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| En: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Año: 2019, Volumen: 16, Número: 6, Páginas: 743-754 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Non-cognitivism
B Error Theory B reductive realism B non-reductive realism |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01606002 |
