Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee
I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2019
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Anno: 2019, Volume: 16, Fascicolo: 6, Pagine: 743-754 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Non-cognitivism
B Error Theory B reductive realism B non-reductive realism |
| Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01606002 |
