La posible y necesaria perentoriedad de los plazos de apelación contra una sentencia «pro vinculo»
Since the reform of marriage nullity causes came into effect in 2015, the consensus has been that the peremptory nature of the time limits for introducing and pursuing an appeal applies only to pro nullitate judgments, not- to pro vinculo judgments that may be subject to later appeal. From an exeget...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Ισπανικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
HeinOnline
2023
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ius canonicum
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 63, Τεύχος: 125, Σελίδες: 143-180 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Apelación
B Carga epistémica B Cosa juzgada |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Since the reform of marriage nullity causes came into effect in 2015, the consensus has been that the peremptory nature of the time limits for introducing and pursuing an appeal applies only to pro nullitate judgments, not- to pro vinculo judgments that may be subject to later appeal. From an exegetical, historical and dogmatic point of view, there are good reasons to hold that pro vinculo judgments also benefit from the peremptory nature of time limits for appeals. The peremptory status of such pro vinculo judgments is possible de iure condito, and both necessary and desirable de iure condendo. |
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| ISSN: | 2254-6219 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ius canonicum
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.15581/016.125.003 |