God and the Value of Free Will
It is standard practice to appeal to libertarian free will to explain how God’s existence might be compatible with much of the evil we see in the actual world. Libertarian free will has also been important to certain responses to the argument for atheism from divine hiddenness. But what is often neg...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2022
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| En: |
Sophia
Año: 2022, Volumen: 61, Número: 3, Páginas: 643-657 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Free Will
B Divine Hiddenness B Evil B God |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | It is standard practice to appeal to libertarian free will to explain how God’s existence might be compatible with much of the evil we see in the actual world. Libertarian free will has also been important to certain responses to the argument for atheism from divine hiddenness. But what is often neglected in appealing to libertarian free will, as others have pointed out, is an explanation of why God would create us with such free will in the first place. Laura Ekstrom argues that free will is simply not worth its cost. J.L. Schellenberg goes a step further and argues that, if it turns out we have libertarian free will, that is actually evidence against God’s existence. In this paper I discuss a couple reasons God might have for creating libertarian free will. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00834-8 |