Divine hiddenness and the problem of no greater goods
John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of greater goods, since there simply would not be greater goods than a conscious personal relationship with God. Given that nonresistant nonbelief withholds the...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2021
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 89, Issue: 2, Pages: 107-123 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Theodicy
/ Highest good
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IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
Further subjects: | B
Theism
B Divine Hiddenness B Atheism B Problem of no greater goods |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of greater goods, since there simply would not be greater goods than a conscious personal relationship with God. Given that nonresistant nonbelief withholds the possibility of such relationship, this entails that God would not allow nonresistant nonbelief for the sake of greater goods. Thus, if Schellenberg is right, all greater goods responses to the hiddenness argument must fail in principle. I argue that there are good reasons for thinking that greater goods responses do not, for the above reason, fail in principle. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09767-7 |