The premortalist free will defense

As a response to the problem of evil, the free will defense proposes that evil might exist as a consequence of God’s endowing human beings with moral freedom which we have tragically misused. Standard versions of the free will defense assume that (1) our moral freedom began in this earthly existence...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Spiegel, James (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2024
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2024, Volume: 95, Issue: 1, Pages: 49-59
Further subjects:B Soul music
B Free Will
B Premortal
B Evil
B God
B Defense
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:As a response to the problem of evil, the free will defense proposes that evil might exist as a consequence of God’s endowing human beings with moral freedom which we have tragically misused. Standard versions of the free will defense assume that (1) our moral freedom began in this earthly existence and (2) what explains our suffering in this world must constitute an abuse rather than a right use of our moral freedom. However, there is another variation of the free will defense that does not share these assumptions. This version of the free will defense appeals to the pre-existence of the human soul. Here I consider a premortalist free will defense according to which each human soul might have rational concourse with God prior to the start of her earthly career and during which she might choose the sort of life she is to live on earth, complete with all of the trials and difficulties necessary to develop a certain kind of desirable character. Given the possibility that such a theory is true, the reach of the free will defense is significantly expanded.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-023-09890-1