A Critique of Rob Lovering's Criticism of the Substance View
In his article, The Substance View: a critique, Rob Lovering argues that the substance view - according to which the human embryo is a person entitled to human rights - leads to such implausible implications that this view should be abandoned. In this article I respond to his criticism by arguing th...
| Main Author: | |
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| Contributors: | ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2015]
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2015, Volume: 29, Issue: 3, Pages: 211-216 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCH Medical ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
substance view
B reductio ad absurdum B Rob Lovering B Abortion |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In his article, The Substance View: a critique, Rob Lovering argues that the substance view - according to which the human embryo is a person entitled to human rights - leads to such implausible implications that this view should be abandoned. In this article I respond to his criticism by arguing that either his arguments fail because the proponents of the substance view are not obligated to hold positions which may be considered absurd, or because the positions which they are assumed to be obligated to hold, are not absurd at all. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "THE SUBSTANCE VIEW: A CRITIQUE (2013)"
Kritik in "The Substance View (2017)" Kritik in "A Critique of Henrik Friberg-Fernros's Defense of the Substance View (2016)" |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12080 |