The Substance View: A Critique (Part 3)
In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2),’ I raise objections to the substance view (naturally), a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christ...
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| Outros Autores: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2017]
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| Em: |
Bioethics
Ano: 2017, Volume: 31, Número: 4, Páginas: 305-312 |
| Classificações IxTheo: | NBE Antropologia NCH Ética da medicina |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Henrik Friberg-Fernros
B extratheoretical moral proposition B intratheoretical moral proposition B substance view B human fetus B Moral Standing B Intrinsic Value |
| Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Resumo: | In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2),’ I raise objections to the substance view (naturally), a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among other human beings. In part two, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of that conclusion. Here, in part three, I raise objections to Henrik Friberg-Fernros's attempt to rebut some of the aforementioned objections. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "A Critique of Rob Lovering's Criticism of the Substance View (2015)"
Kritik in "Hit but not down. The substance view in light of the criticism of Lovering and Simkulet (2018)" |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12330 |
