A Critique of Henrik Friberg-Fernros's Defense of the Substance View
Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view - the rescue argument...
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| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2016]
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2016, Volume: 30, Issue: 9, Pages: 767-773 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCH Medical ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
Henrik Friberg-Fernros
B substance view B spontaneous abortion B Rob Lovering B Abortion |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view - the rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik Friberg-Fernros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I argue would be inconsistent with the anti-abortion stance taken by most substance view theorists. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "A Critique of Rob Lovering's Criticism of the Substance View (2015)"
Kritik in "Hit but not down. The substance view in light of the criticism of Lovering and Simkulet (2018)" |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12289 |