Atemporalism and dependence
It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is "outside" of time, he does not foreknow anything (rather, his knowledge is timeless)—constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
|
| En: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2020, Volumen: 87, Número: 2, Páginas: 149-164 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Dios
/ Atemporalidad
/ Omnisciencia
/ Libre albedrío
|
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión NBC Dios |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Atemporalism
B Dependence B Freedom B Foreknowledge |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Sumario: | It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is "outside" of time, he does not foreknow anything (rather, his knowledge is timeless)—constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape certain worries (raised independently by Alvin Plantinga and Linda Zagzebski), the view must appeal to the dependence of God's timeless knowledge on our actions. I then argue that, because it must appeal to such dependence, Atemporalism is crucially similar to the recent sempiternalist accounts proposed by Trenton Merricks, Philip Swenson, and Jonathan Westphal, and I conclude by briefly sketching some implications of this result. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09746-y |