Expressivism and Mind-Dependence: Distinct Existences

Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in some objectionable way. This paper develops an argument which not only shows that this...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Köhler, Sebastian (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2014
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2014, Volume: 11, Issue: 6, Pages: 750-764
Further subjects:B mind-dependence
B Meta-ethics
B Expressivism
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Summary:Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in some objectionable way. This paper develops an argument which not only shows that this is and cannot be the case, but also – and perhaps more importantly – offers a diagnosis why philosophers are nevertheless so often led to think otherwise.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-4681039