The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine

It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Nawar, Tamer (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2022
In: Vivarium
Year: 2022, Volume: 60, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-27
Further subjects:B Augustine
B mind-body problem
B Platonism
B Causation
B metaphysical dependence
B Stoicism
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Summary:It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.
ISSN:1568-5349
Contains:Enthalten in: Vivarium
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/15685349-05904001