Craig’s Nominalism and the High Cost of Preserving Divine Aseity

William Lane Craig rejects Platonism (the view that uncreated abstract objects (AOs) exist) in favor of nominalism because he believes Platonism fatally compromises God’s aseity. For Craig, concrete particulars (including essences) exist, but properties do not. Yet, we use property-talk, following C...

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主要作者: Smith, R. Scott (Author)
格式: 電子 Article
語言:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
出版: [2017]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2017, 卷: 9, 發布: 1, Pages: 87-107
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Craig, William Lane 1949- / 唯名論 / / 神的自存
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
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實物特徵
總結:William Lane Craig rejects Platonism (the view that uncreated abstract objects (AOs) exist) in favor of nominalism because he believes Platonism fatally compromises God’s aseity. For Craig, concrete particulars (including essences) exist, but properties do not. Yet, we use property-talk, following Carnap’s “linguistic frameworks.” There is, however, a high cost to Craig’s view. I survey his views and then explore the importance of essences. But, next, I show that his nominalism undermines them. Thus, we have just interpretations of reality. Worse, nominalism undermines creation’s determinacy. Last, I suggest AOs are created, but in a more fundamental sense than Craig considers.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1866