Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity
Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best ex...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Brill
2017
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| Em: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Ano: 2017, Volume: 7, Número: 2, Páginas: 91-113 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Juízo moral
/ Realismo moral
/ Ceticismo
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| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
moral skepticism
epistemic sensitivity
epistemic reliability
moral explanations
Richard Joyce
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| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Resumo: | Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth, so we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments. But it is unclear how to get from the explanatory premise to the debunking conclusion. This paper shows how to get from here to there by way of epistemic insensitivity. First, we reconstruct Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument from insensitivity. Second, we raise epistemological difficulties for Joyce’s argument. Third, we develop and defend a new debunking argument from insensitivity. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Obras secundárias: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171195 |