Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck

Abstract Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably exp...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Authors: Guttel, Ehud (Author) ; Enoch, David (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Brill 2010
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2010, Volume: 7, Issue: 3, Pages: 372-386
Further subjects:B DEBUNKING EXPLANATION
B Moral Luck
B COGNITIVE BIAS
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:Abstract Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably explained away – as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance they would have.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/174552410X511464