Wittgenstein and Dretske on Knowledge and Certainty
I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind th...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Brill
2016
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В: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Год: 2016, Том: 6, Выпуск: 2/3, Страницы: 260-273 |
Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Knowledge
/ Certitude
/ Dretske, Fred I. 1932-2013
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Другие ключевые слова: | B
Knowledge
certainty
scepticism
hinge
information
Wittgenstein
Dretske
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Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Итог: | I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind the axis/hinge and the riverbed/flux-of-the-waters analogies finds a counterpart in Dretske’s perspective with the opposition between information and conditions of the channel of communication. This comparative analysis puts into light the epistemic functions at stake in Wittgenstein’s analogies and in Dretske’s framework, as well as two common conclusions that both Wittgenstein and Dretske share about the status and the scope of sceptical doubts. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Второстепенные работы: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603011 |