Wittgenstein and Dretske on Knowledge and Certainty

I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind th...

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Библиографические подробности
Главный автор: Bouchard, Yves 1963- (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Опубликовано: Brill 2016
В: International journal for the study of skepticism
Год: 2016, Том: 6, Выпуск: 2/3, Страницы: 260-273
Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности):B Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit / Knowledge / Certitude / Dretske, Fred I. 1932-2013
Другие ключевые слова:B Knowledge certainty scepticism hinge information Wittgenstein Dretske
Online-ссылка: Volltext (Verlag)
Описание
Итог:I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind the axis/hinge and the riverbed/flux-of-the-waters analogies finds a counterpart in Dretske’s perspective with the opposition between information and conditions of the channel of communication. This comparative analysis puts into light the epistemic functions at stake in Wittgenstein’s analogies and in Dretske’s framework, as well as two common conclusions that both Wittgenstein and Dretske share about the status and the scope of sceptical doubts.
ISSN:2210-5700
Второстепенные работы:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603011