Epistemic Norms and the Limits of Epistemology
I raise a dilemma for an epistemology based on the idea that there are hinge propositions or primitive certainties: either such propositions are norms or rules in the “grammatical” sense, but they cannot regulate our inquiries since they are not genuine propositions obeying truth or evidential stand...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2016
|
| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 228-247 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Epistemic modal logic
/ Norm
/ Knowledge
/ Cognition theory
|
| Further subjects: | B
hinges
certainty
epistemology
rules
epistemic norms
Wittgenstein
Crispin Wright
|
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | I raise a dilemma for an epistemology based on the idea that there are hinge propositions or primitive certainties: either such propositions are norms or rules in the “grammatical” sense, but they cannot regulate our inquiries since they are not genuine propositions obeying truth or evidential standards, or they are epistemic norms, but compete with the classical norms of belief and knowledge. Either there are hinges, but they have nothing to do with epistemology, or hinges are part of our knowledge, and their epistemology is part of ordinary epistemology. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011218 |