Is There a Problem of Demarcation for Hinges?
Hinge epistemology is sometimes taken to be exempt from many of the issues bedevilling regular epistemology because of its pre-epistemic status. That is, hinges are taken to operate beyond epistemic evaluation. In this paper, I go through different non-epistemicist interpretations of what hinge epis...
Autore principale: | |
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Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Pubblicazione: |
2022
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Anno: 2022, Volume: 12, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 317-330 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
Moore
B On Certainty B hinge epistemology B Wittgenstein B problem of demarcation |
Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Riepilogo: | Hinge epistemology is sometimes taken to be exempt from many of the issues bedevilling regular epistemology because of its pre-epistemic status. That is, hinges are taken to operate beyond epistemic evaluation. In this paper, I go through different non-epistemicist interpretations of what hinge epistemology is and in what sense hinges may precede epistemic evaluation. I argue that all these non-epistemicist accounts nevertheless have to deal with a certain extent of epistemic evaluation, namely, a form of the historical problem of demarcation arises in hinge epistemology: of two incompatible hinges, one may nevertheless be epistemically preferrable over the other even though they both are pre-epistemic hinges. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10040 |