Wittgenstein and Dretske on Knowledge and Certainty
I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind th...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2016
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 6, Τεύχος: 2/3, Σελίδες: 260-273 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Γνώση
/ Βεβαιότητα
/ Dretske, Fred I. 1932-2013
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| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Knowledge
certainty
scepticism
hinge
information
Wittgenstein
Dretske
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind the axis/hinge and the riverbed/flux-of-the-waters analogies finds a counterpart in Dretske’s perspective with the opposition between information and conditions of the channel of communication. This comparative analysis puts into light the epistemic functions at stake in Wittgenstein’s analogies and in Dretske’s framework, as well as two common conclusions that both Wittgenstein and Dretske share about the status and the scope of sceptical doubts. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603011 |