Wittgenstein and Dretske on Knowledge and Certainty

I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind th...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Bouchard, Yves 1963- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill 2016
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2016, Band: 6, Heft: 2/3, Seiten: 260-273
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit / Wissen / Gewissheit / Dretske, Fred I. 1932-2013
weitere Schlagwörter:B Knowledge certainty scepticism hinge information Wittgenstein Dretske
Online Zugang: Volltext (Verlag)
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:I establish and I explore a parallel between two important analogies in Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty, and two characteristic features of Dretske’s information-theoretic model of knowledge. My claim is that the analogical opposition (a static/dynamic type of opposition) behind the axis/hinge and the riverbed/flux-of-the-waters analogies finds a counterpart in Dretske’s perspective with the opposition between information and conditions of the channel of communication. This comparative analysis puts into light the epistemic functions at stake in Wittgenstein’s analogies and in Dretske’s framework, as well as two common conclusions that both Wittgenstein and Dretske share about the status and the scope of sceptical doubts.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603011