Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner
In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Brill
2016
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| В: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Год: 2016, Том: 6, Выпуск: 4, Страницы: 397-403 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Скептицизм
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| Другие ключевые слова: | B
skeptical scenarios
closure principle
kk principle
false belief account
ignorance account
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| Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Итог: | In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Второстепенные работы: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05041194 |