Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis

According to epistemological disjunctivism I can claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. My possession of such knowledge is incompatible with a number of familiar skeptical scenarios (for example, that I am currently being deceived by an evil demon). S...

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主要作者: Lockhart, Thomas (Author)
格式: 電子 Article
語言:English
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
出版: 2018
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, 卷: 8, 發布: 1, Pages: 1-30
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B McDowell, John Henry 1942- / 认识逻辑 / 逻辑或 (邏輯)
Further subjects:B epistemological disjunctivism skeptical scenarios John McDowell Duncan Pritchard
在線閱讀: Volltext (Publisher)
實物特徵
總結:According to epistemological disjunctivism I can claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. My possession of such knowledge is incompatible with a number of familiar skeptical scenarios (for example, that I am currently being deceived by an evil demon). So a paradigmatic epistemological disjunctivist perceptual experience should allow me to rule out such incompatible skeptical scenarios. In this paper, I consider skeptical scenarios which both cast doubt on my conviction that I can trust my purported perceptual experiences and appear to be compatible with my enjoying a veridical perceptual experience of my environment. Such skeptical scenarios draw attention to a significant difference between McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism and Pritchard’s. McDowellian epistemological disjunctivism has the resources to rule out such skeptical scenarios but Pritchard’s does not. This is because the Pritchardian epistemological disjunctivist does not, unlike McDowell, insist on the idea that perception is a fallible capacity, self-consciously exercised and possessed, for knowledge.
實物描述:Online-Ressource
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001247