Autonomy, Experience, and Reflection. On a Neglected Aspect of Personal Autonomy
The aim of this paper is to suggest that a necessary condition of autonomy has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature: the capacity to critically reflect on one’s practical attitudes (desires, preferences, values, etc.) in the light of new experiences. It will be argued that most promine...
| VerfasserInnen: | ; ; |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2010
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2010, Band: 13, Heft: 3, Seiten: 239-253 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Experience
B hierarchical accounts of B historical accounts of B Manipulation B Personal Autonomy B internalist and externalist accounts of B Autonomy B critical reflection |
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Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | The aim of this paper is to suggest that a necessary condition of autonomy has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature: the capacity to critically reflect on one’s practical attitudes (desires, preferences, values, etc.) in the light of new experiences. It will be argued that most prominent accounts of autonomy—ahistorical as well as history-sensitive—have either altogether failed to recognize this condition or at least failed to give an explicit account of it. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-009-9205-3 |
