Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner
In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2016
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2016, Volume: 6, Numéro: 4, Pages: 397-403 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Scepticisme
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
skeptical scenarios
closure principle
kk principle
false belief account
ignorance account
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| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) |
| Résumé: | In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05041194 |