Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner
In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2016
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 6, Τεύχος: 4, Σελίδες: 397-403 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Σκεπτικισμός
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| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
skeptical scenarios
closure principle
kk principle
false belief account
ignorance account
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05041194 |