God's Love and the Horrendous Deeds Objection: a Response to Flannagan
The horrendous deeds objection to metaethical divine command theory (MDCT) says that since God can command anything whatsoever, even things that are horrendous, MDCT seems to imply that God can make any action, no matter how repugnant, morally obligatory. Defenders of MDCT frequently claim, by way o...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Netherlands
2024
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 2024, Volume: 63, Issue: 1, Pages: 43-56 |
| Further subjects: | B
God and morality
B Divine Command Theory B Euthyphro dilemma B Matthew Flannagan |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The horrendous deeds objection to metaethical divine command theory (MDCT) says that since God can command anything whatsoever, even things that are horrendous, MDCT seems to imply that God can make any action, no matter how repugnant, morally obligatory. Defenders of MDCT frequently claim, by way of response, that since God is essentially omnibenevolent, it is impossible that he commands us to do horrendous things. I have recently argued that it is irrelevant that God cannot issue horrible commands. The argument runs as follows: On MDCT, God has moral grounding power - the power to make an action morally obligatory by commanding that we do it. Given that omnipotence is possession of maximal power, every omnipotent being has this power. In some possible world, there exists a non-benevolent omnipotent being who issues horrible commands. Therefore, on MDCT, there is a possible world in which some horrendous action is morally obligatory. Matthew Flannagan has responded to this argument on behalf of the divine command theorist. Flannagan argues that since, on MDCT, moral obligations are constituted by God's commands, and no other being can perform God's actions, no other being can possess moral grounding power. In this paper, I criticize Flannagan’s argument. His argument assumes that when some phenomenon is constituted by the actions of an agent, no other agent's actions can constitute this phenomenon. I argue that this assumption is false. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Why the Horrendous Deeds Objection Is Still a Bad Argument (2022)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-022-00942-z |