The doing/allowing distinction in the divine context
The theist needs a conception of the distinction between doing and allowing because much of the literature focused on the problem of evil attempts to justify (via theodicy) or defend (via defence) God's allowing evil to occur. I present a counterfactual account of the doing/allowing distinction...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2024
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| В: |
Religious studies
Год: 2024, Том: 60, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 302-312 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Counterfactuals
B divine intentions B problem of evil B doing / allowing |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Итог: | The theist needs a conception of the distinction between doing and allowing because much of the literature focused on the problem of evil attempts to justify (via theodicy) or defend (via defence) God's allowing evil to occur. I present a counterfactual account of the doing/allowing distinction in the divine context and argue that, even if there are compelling objections to counterfactual accounts of the distinction in the human context, they do not work against such an account in the divine context. The counterfactual analysis to follow will allow the theist to plausibly claim that God does not ever bring about evil, which is crucial to some defences against the problem of evil. I conclude by defending my account against possible objections. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412523000550 |
