Doing, Allowing, and Occasionalism

In ‘God, evil, and occasionalism’ Matthew Shea and C.P. Ragland appeal to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to argue against Alvin Plantinga that occasionalism is morally worse than conservationism. In this article I critically examine their argument and conclude that it fails because it contains a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Religious studies
Subtitles:Special issue: "The Existence and Nature of Deities"
Main Author: Şen, Sümer (Author)
Format: Electronic Review
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 2022
In: Religious studies
Review of:God, evil, and occasionalism (2018) (Şen, Sümer)
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Shea, Matthew / Ragland, Clyde P. 1970- / Theodicy / Occasionalism / Suffering / Causality
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NBC Doctrine of God
Further subjects:B doing suffering
B Book review
B Occasionalism
B Doing and Allowing
B indirect and direct causation
B allowing suffering
B conservationism
B God
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Description
Summary:In ‘God, evil, and occasionalism’ Matthew Shea and C.P. Ragland appeal to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to argue against Alvin Plantinga that occasionalism is morally worse than conservationism. In this article I critically examine their argument and conclude that it fails because it contains an equivocation or is unwarranted. I also offer a case against their position by, first, arguing that on none of three prominent accounts of doing and allowing God merely allows suffering.Second, I develop the ‘Epistemological-Equivalence Argument’ in order to show that even if we grant such a distinction for God's acts, they would be morally on a par.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412521000056