Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates
Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explai...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
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| Опубликовано: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2006
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| В: |
Zygon
Год: 2006, Том: 41, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 249-266 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Cognitive Science
B Daniel Dennett B Francis Crick B Consciousness B Zombies B Соул B Roger Penrose B Mind B Stephen Mithen B David Chalmers B Reductionism B Materialism |
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| Итог: | Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00738.x |