Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates
Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explai...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2006
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| Em: |
Zygon
Ano: 2006, Volume: 41, Número: 2, Páginas: 249-266 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Cognitive Science
B Música soul B Daniel Dennett B Francis Crick B Consciousness B Zombies B Roger Penrose B Mind B Stephen Mithen B David Chalmers B Reductionism B Materialism |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Não eletrônico
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| Resumo: | Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00738.x |
