Doing, Allowing, and Occasionalism
In ‘God, evil, and occasionalism’ Matthew Shea and C.P. Ragland appeal to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to argue against Alvin Plantinga that occasionalism is morally worse than conservationism. In this article I critically examine their argument and conclude that it fails because it contains a...
Nebentitel: | Special issue: "The Existence and Nature of Deities" |
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1. VerfasserIn: | |
Medienart: | Elektronisch Review |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2022
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In: |
Religious studies
Jahr: 2022, Band: 58, Heft: 3, Seiten: 505-521 |
Rezension von: | God, evil, and occasionalism (2018) (Şen, Sümer)
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normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Shea, Matthew
/ Ragland, Clyde P. 1970-
/ Theodizee
/ Okkasionalismus
/ Leid
/ Kausalität
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IxTheo Notationen: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NBC Gotteslehre |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
doing suffering
B Rezension B Occasionalism B Doing and Allowing B indirect and direct causation B allowing suffering B conservationism B God |
Online Zugang: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Zusammenfassung: | In ‘God, evil, and occasionalism’ Matthew Shea and C.P. Ragland appeal to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to argue against Alvin Plantinga that occasionalism is morally worse than conservationism. In this article I critically examine their argument and conclude that it fails because it contains an equivocation or is unwarranted. I also offer a case against their position by, first, arguing that on none of three prominent accounts of doing and allowing God merely allows suffering.Second, I develop the ‘Epistemological-Equivalence Argument’ in order to show that even if we grant such a distinction for God's acts, they would be morally on a par. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412521000056 |