Virtue, Well-being, and the Good Life

Inspired by Aristotle, Paul Bloomfield holds that all genuine reasons for action are explained in terms of one basic goal: to live a Good Life. But living morally—choosing and performing brave, temperate, just, and wise actions—is necessary (though not sufficient) for the Good Life. Using ideas from...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Raibley, Jason R. (Author)
Format: Electronic Review
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2018
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2018, Volume: 15, Issue: 6, Pages: 767-780
Further subjects:B Book review
B Happiness
B Eudaimonism
B Well-being
B immoralism
B Virtue
B the good life
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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