Constructing a Good Life
In The Value of Living Well, Mark LeBar develops a position that he calls “virtue eudaimonism” (ve). ve is both a eudaimonistic theory of practical reasoning and a constructivist account of the metaphysics of value. In this essay, I will explain the core of LeBar’s view and focus on two issues, one...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
2016
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Στο/Στη: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 13, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 363-375 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Eudaimonism
B Value B Egoism B Virtue Ethics B Practical Reason B Constructivism |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | In The Value of Living Well, Mark LeBar develops a position that he calls “virtue eudaimonism” (ve). ve is both a eudaimonistic theory of practical reasoning and a constructivist account of the metaphysics of value. In this essay, I will explain the core of LeBar’s view and focus on two issues, one concerning ve’s eudaimonism and the other concerning ve’s constructivism. I will argue that, as it stands, ve does not adequately address the charge of egoism, once that charge has been formulated in the strongest way. I will also argue that a substantive constructivism like ve must have considerably less explanatory power than any (successful) constructivism that appeals to a formal characterization of agency. Although my remarks are largely critical, I offer them in a spirit of sympathetic engagement with LeBar’s impressive book. |
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ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01303001 |