An American Operational Response to a Request to Bomb Rail Lines to Auschwitz
The last request to bomb the rail lines leading to Auschwitz reached the U.S. War Department in late August 1944; this request has been mentioned rarely in the historical literature, and without discussion of its military aspects. Newly identified documents from the War Department and the Mediterran...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2011
|
| In: |
Holocaust and genocide studies
Year: 2011, Volume: 25, Issue: 3, Pages: 438-446 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The last request to bomb the rail lines leading to Auschwitz reached the U.S. War Department in late August 1944; this request has been mentioned rarely in the historical literature, and without discussion of its military aspects. Newly identified documents from the War Department and the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), however, permit a more thorough consideration of its rejection. The author examines the operational context and compares the case to MAAF responses to two similar requests by Allied governments-in-exile. The author discusses the September 1944 bombing of one deportation rail line as an alternate target of last resort. The Allied priority of final victory ultimately precluded diversion of resources to what military decision-makers perceived as non-essential goals. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1476-7937 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Holocaust and genocide studies
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1093/hgs/dcr049 |