Calculated Indifference: The Soviet Union and Requests to Bomb Auschwitz
In the ongoing debate about whether the Allies should have bombed the Auschwitz extermination camp, the Soviet Union is rarely mentioned. Focusing on four operational challenges—accuracy, range, time, and intelligence—the authors compare British, American, and Soviet preparedness for such a mission....
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press
2013
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| In: |
Holocaust and genocide studies
Year: 2013, Volume: 27, Issue: 1, Pages: 90-113 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In the ongoing debate about whether the Allies should have bombed the Auschwitz extermination camp, the Soviet Union is rarely mentioned. Focusing on four operational challenges—accuracy, range, time, and intelligence—the authors compare British, American, and Soviet preparedness for such a mission. In addition, on the basis of little-used documentary evidence, they argue that Stalin's refusal to bomb Auschwitz must be attributed not only to his antisemitism, but also to a complicated shift in the Soviet Union's nationalities policy. |
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| ISSN: | 1476-7937 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Holocaust and genocide studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1093/hgs/dct002 |