Ralph Cudworth's Divine Conceptualism and the Bootstrapping Objection
In this paper, I defend divine conceptualism against one prominent critique from William Lane Craig in his book God and Abstract Objects. Craig argues that the divine conceptualist’s only way out of the "bootstrapping objection" results in an unpalatable concession of defeat to the metaphy...
| Published in: | Philosophia Christi |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
EPS
2021
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| In: |
Philosophia Christi
Year: 2021, Volume: 23, Issue: 2, Pages: 367-376 |
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In this paper, I defend divine conceptualism against one prominent critique from William Lane Craig in his book God and Abstract Objects. Craig argues that the divine conceptualist’s only way out of the "bootstrapping objection" results in an unpalatable concession of defeat to the metaphysical anti-realist. Craig's argument depends on an analysis whereby God is causally or logically prior to the divine concepts. As such, the conceptualist may resist it by adopting - following Ralph Cudworth - a version of divine conceptualism which does not construe the relationship between God and His thoughts as one of either causal or logical priority. |
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| ISSN: | 1529-1634 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Philosophia Christi
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/pc202123230 |