On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism
Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2016]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 8, Issue: 4, Pages: 195-212 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Platonism
/ God
/ Conceptualism
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true and we should therefore identify propositions with the contents of a divine mind, i.e., God. In this paper, I argue that Gould and Davis argument against Propositional Platonism fails since it depends upon a number of assumptions that the Propositional Platonist need not accept. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1763 |