Ignorance in Plato’s Protagoras: An Inquiry into Humanity’s Dark Side
Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people ar...
Publié dans: | Phronesis |
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Auteur principal: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2022
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Dans: |
Phronesis
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Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Protagoras
B Socrates B Ignorance B Vice B Akrasia B Knowledge |
Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. |
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ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10058 |