Moral and Factual Ignorance: a Quality of Will Parity

Within debates concerning responsibility for ignorance the distinction between moral and factual ignorance is often treated as crucial. Many prominent accounts hold that while factual ignorance routinely exculpates, moral ignorance never does so. The view that there is an in-principle distinction be...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hartford, Anna (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2019]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2019, Volume: 22, Issue: 5, Pages: 1087-1102
Further subjects:B Factual ignorance
B Parity thesis
B Asymmetry thesis
B Quality of will
B Moral ignorance
B Volitionism
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Description
Summary:Within debates concerning responsibility for ignorance the distinction between moral and factual ignorance is often treated as crucial. Many prominent accounts hold that while factual ignorance routinely exculpates, moral ignorance never does so. The view that there is an in-principle distinction between moral and factual ignorance has been referred to as the "Asymmetry Thesis." This view stands in opposition to the "Parity Thesis," which holds that moral and factual ignorance are in-principle similar. The Parity Thesis has been closely aligned with volitionist accounts of moral responsibility, whereas the Asymmetry Thesis has been closely aligned with Quality of Will accounts. Two central questions are at work here: how ignorance excuses (when it does), and whether it excuses in the same way for both moral and factual ignorance. I will argue that these questions have often been confused in the present debate, and once we have distinguished more clearly between them, it seems that Quality of Will accounts are compatible with the Parity Thesis. And more generally: that the distinction between moral and factual ignorance is far less important in debates about responsibility for ignorance than it has often appeared.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-019-10043-5