Let's Play GOLF! Or, the Free Will Defense Is Dead

A central feature of the "free will defense" as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of "morally significant freedom&q...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:  
Detalhes bibliográficos
Outros títulos:The Free Will Defense Is Dead
Autor principal: Cowan, Steven B. 1962- (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Carregar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado em: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain 2021
Em: TheoLogica
Ano: 2021, Volume: 5, Número: 2, Páginas: 178-193
Classificações IxTheo:AB Filosofia da religião
NBC Deus
NBE Antropologia
NCA Ética
Outras palavras-chave:B Free Will Defense
B Theodicy
B Libertarianism
B Alvin Plantinga
B problem of evil
Acesso em linha: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Descrição
Resumo:A central feature of the "free will defense" as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of "morally significant freedom" according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.
ISSN:2593-0265
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: TheoLogica
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.14428/thl.v5i2.20343