Governing [through] Autonomy. The Moral and Legal Limits of “Soft Paternalism”
Legal restrictions of the right to self-determination increasingly pretend to be compatible with the liberal concept of autonomy: they act upon a ‘soft’ or autonomy-orientated paternalistic rationale. Conventional liberal critique of paternalism turns out to be insensitive to the intricate normative...
Autori: | ; |
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Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2014
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2014, Volume: 17, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 383-397 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
Autonomy-oriented paternalism
B Soft paternalism B Weak paternalism B Autonomy B Libertarian paternalism |
Accesso online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Riepilogo: | Legal restrictions of the right to self-determination increasingly pretend to be compatible with the liberal concept of autonomy: they act upon a ‘soft’ or autonomy-orientated paternalistic rationale. Conventional liberal critique of paternalism turns out to be insensitive to the intricate normative problems following from ‘soft’ or ‘libertarian’ paternalism. In fact, these autonomy-oriented forms of paternalism could actually be even more problematic and may infringe liberty rights even more intensely than hard paternalistic regulation. This paper contributes to the systematic differentiation of soft and hard paternalism by discussing the (legal) concept of autonomy and elaborates the moral and legal limits of autonomy-orientated paternalism. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9450-3 |