The Morality System with and without God
What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality “either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing”. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2001
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2001, Volume: 4, Numéro: 4, Pages: 383-399 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
God and morality
B Divine Command Theory B moral obligation: real and inescapable B sources of normativity |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality “either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing”. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1013387507076 |