Does natural law have non-normative foundations?

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s positio...

全面介紹

Saved in:  
書目詳細資料
主要作者: Gold, Ian (Author)
格式: 電子 Article
語言:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
載入...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
出版: Springer Netherlands 2002
In: Sophia
Year: 2002, 卷: 41, 發布: 1, Pages: 1-17
Further subjects:B Constitutive Rule
B Moral Claim
B Theoretical Reason
B Moral Theory
B Practical Reason
在線閱讀: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
實物特徵
總結:This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contains:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF02780399