Does natural law have non-normative foundations?

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s positio...

Descrizione completa

Salvato in:  
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Gold, Ian (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
Verificare la disponibilità: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Caricamento...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Pubblicazione: Springer Netherlands 2002
In: Sophia
Anno: 2002, Volume: 41, Fascicolo: 1, Pagine: 1-17
Altre parole chiave:B Constitutive Rule
B Moral Claim
B Theoretical Reason
B Moral Theory
B Practical Reason
Accesso online: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descrizione
Riepilogo:This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position.
ISSN:1873-930X
Comprende:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF02780399