Does natural law have non-normative foundations?

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s positio...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Gold, Ian (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2002
En: Sophia
Año: 2002, Volumen: 41, Número: 1, Páginas: 1-17
Otras palabras clave:B Constitutive Rule
B Moral Claim
B Theoretical Reason
B Moral Theory
B Practical Reason
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position.
ISSN:1873-930X
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF02780399