The problem of evil: Two neglected defences
Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence., A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible Wor...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Netherlands
1981
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In: |
Sophia
Year: 1981, Volume: 20, Issue: 1, Pages: 49-54 |
Further subjects: | B
Arbitrary Line
B Soft Determinist B Philosophical Problem B Good World B Perfect Version |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence., A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible World Defence, is that God’s goodness need not determine God’s choice to create. The reasons, if any, which God has are relevant to the Theological Problem of Evil but not to the Philosophical Problem of Evil. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02782747 |