Classical Theism, Arbitrary Creation, and Reason-Based Action

Surely God, as a perfectly rational being, created the universe for some reason. But is God’s creating the universe for a reason compatible with divine impassibility? That is the question I investigate in this article. The prima facie tension between impassibility and God’s creating for a reason ari...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schmid, Joseph C. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2022
In: Sophia
Year: 2022, Volume: 61, Issue: 3, Pages: 565-579
Further subjects:B Divine impassibility
B Divine Simplicity
B Arbitrary creation
B Divine Action
B Classical Theism
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:Surely God, as a perfectly rational being, created the universe for some reason. But is God’s creating the universe for a reason compatible with divine impassibility? That is the question I investigate in this article. The prima facie tension between impassibility and God’s creating for a reason arises from impassibility’s commitment to God being uninfluenced by anything ad extra. If God is uninfluenced in this way, asks the detractor, how could he be moved to create anything at all? This prima facie tension has recently been formalized and dubbed the ‘Problem of Arbitrary Creation’. In this article, I defend a new extension of this problem. I begin by characterizing classical theism, divine simplicity, and divine impassibility. I then spell out the Problem of Arbitrary Creation as developed by R. T. Mullins. I next raise a worry for Mullins’ version of the argument. Finally, I extend the argument and show how my extension avoids the aforementioned worry.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contains:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00895-9