Aquinas on Evil and the Will: A response to Mackie*
This article argues that, without being reducible to a version of the Free Will Defence, Aquinas' theodicy and philosophical theology can offer contemporary versions of the Free Will Defence stronger metaphysical and theological foundations from which a response to Mackie's compatibilistic...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2021
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In: |
New blackfriars
Year: 2021, Volume: 102, Issue: 1102, Pages: 997-1014 |
Further subjects: | B
On Evil
B Free Will B Free Will Defence B Mackie B Aquinas B problem of evil |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | This article argues that, without being reducible to a version of the Free Will Defence, Aquinas' theodicy and philosophical theology can offer contemporary versions of the Free Will Defence stronger metaphysical and theological foundations from which a response to Mackie's compatibilistic challenge – probably the most serious challenge against this defence – can be derived. Mackie's challenge to the Free Will Defence is the argument that the possibility of evil is not a necessary condition for the existence of free will, for God – if He existed and was omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient – could have and would have created rational and free agents such that they would always freely choose the good. I claim, following Aquinas' hylomorphic ontology, that the creation of such a will is logically impossible as it would require the creation of a will containing naturally and invariably the formality of the universal and perfect good, and so the creation of a will indistinct from God's, which is by nature uncreated. |
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ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/nbfr.12579 |