Philosophical Comments on Ahmed’s Proposal
Arif Ahmed’s paper claims moral neutrality for game theory. This is not true, however, of much of classical game theory, for example Ken Binmore’s Game Theory and the Social Contract (1994). The field has changed comparatively recently. With respect to his own version, he claims that evolutionary ex...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Sage
2013
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| In: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Anno: 2013, Volume: 26, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 184-185 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Game Theory
B Logical Positivism B Human Nature |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | Arif Ahmed’s paper claims moral neutrality for game theory. This is not true, however, of much of classical game theory, for example Ken Binmore’s Game Theory and the Social Contract (1994). The field has changed comparatively recently. With respect to his own version, he claims that evolutionary explanation of cooperation is incompatible with theism, but this is because he thinks just about anything is compatible with it. It is important to see that this critique is the same as the logical positivists’ critique in the 1950s, for example in Antony Flew’s parable of the invisible gardener. The logical positivists thought that a statement could only be meaningful if it is either a tautology or empirically verifiable or falsifiable. But a claim that God exists is not subject to empirical confirmation, because God is not that kind of being. To dismiss the claim on that basis is just to beg the question. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0953946812473025 |